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“Intellectual property is the Web’s war zone.”  





In recent years, the Internet has become both a major front in the “battle” between proponents 
of open access to new technologies versus proponents of the protection of proprietary rights, 
and a key source of patent-related information. Developments in Internet technology have 
been accompanied by an increasingly strategic view of patents by firms seeking to maximize 
the overall value of their intellectual property (Knight, 1996, Grindley and Teece, 1997, 
Davis, 1998, Ransley and Gaffney, 1997, Rivette and Kline, 2000a,b). While it has long been 
recognized that the costs of patenting go hand in hand with the benefits (cf. Penrose, 1951, 
Machlup, 1968), the explosive growth of the Internet has extended the ways in which firms 
can use patents strategically, and amplified the broader policy debate as to what inventions 
should be patentable, and how strong patent protection should be. 
 
This chapter explores some of the implications of these changes by focusing on two 
questions. First, to what degree can Internet business methods be patented, and what are the 
implications of these patents for firms and society? For example, Amazon.com, Inc. has U.S. 
patent on its one-click technology, offering Internet shoppers an easy-to-use online tool. 
British Telecom has a U.S. patent on hyperlink technology. As of this writing, such 
“software-implemented business methods” are not patentable outside the United States. Many 
U.S. patents on Internet business methods may well be found invalid in coming years. The 
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extension of patent protection to Internet business methods in the United States has led some 
observers to fear a “crisis” in the patent system. Writes Seth Shulman (2000: 75): 
It was never the object of patent laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a 
shade of an idea…Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to 
stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the 
advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable 
them to lay a heavy tax on the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real 
advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of 
unknown liability lawsuits and vexations accounting for profits made in good faith. 
 
Some fear that if patents on Internet business methods are generally found to be valid, 
extended into other national jurisdictions and strongly enforced, they could threaten the 
traditionally open access of the Internet. Countries outside the U.S. also need to decide 
whether or not to permit patents of this type. 
 
Second, how does the Internet, as a rapid, highly efficient, global communications and 
distribution medium, affect firm patenting practices? The proliferation of information on the 
Internet clearly helps firms to analyze who has taken out what patents in their area and when, 
and how central these patents are to their own R&D efforts. Patent-holders deemed “in the 
way” can become targets for take-over, or perhaps be invited to form a joint venture (another 
means of extracting the rents). New business tools, like web-enabled exchanges for patents 
and licenses, have been created, linking potential buyers and sellers of intellectual property, 
but often also providing a range of other services. These include evaluating the patents on 
offer and insurance policies to mitigate the risk of buying a patent that later is found to be 
invalid. In sum, the Internet considerably enhances the innovating firm’s ability to access 
patent-related information posted on the World Wide Web, to signal its activities and 
intentions to other market participants, and to exchange patent-related information. 
 
Our arguments in this paper are based on sources from the literature, conference 
presentations, and interviews. Since the development of the Internet is so recent, and the focus 
of investigation has not yet, to my knowledge, been subject to rigorous analysis in the 
business and economics literature, the paper should mainly be seen as a preliminary effort to 
reflect on the answers to these two questions, given the nature of the Internet and the 
economics of the patent system.  
 
Our tentative conclusions are as follows. As regards the first question, it is important to 
differentiate between the U.S. situation, and the situation of countries that have not yet 
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permitted patents on software-implemented business methods (for reasons of space, we will 
mainly confine our discussion of the latter to the European Patent Convention). In the United 
States, given the recent, almost “chaotic” developments as regards what can and cannot be 
patented in this area, it is urgent to define more clearly which kinds of Internet business 
methods fulfill the criteria of patentability, and which do not. We will argue that the definition 
of what is patentable in the U.S. should be raised, to avoid the issuance of so many trivial 
patents, and reduce the costs of these patents to innovating firms and society. Outside the 
U.S., permitting the patentability of Internet business methods raises fundamental issues, not 
only for this particular group of inventions, but also for to the criteria of patentability more 
generally. In Europe, an invention must have some sort of “technical effect” to be patented; in 
the U.S., the requirement is only that the invention is industrially useful. Thus if Europe 
adopts the U.S. approach to business method patents, it would have significant implications 
not only for the patentability of software-implemented business methods, but also with regard 
to the definition of what constitutes a patentable invention according to the European Patent 
Convention more generally. Ideally, these issues should be resolved through a new 
international agreement. 
 
Turning to the second question, the advent of the Internet means that patent information in 
databases and related sources can far more easily than in the past be collated, systematized 
and transmitted electronically whenever and wherever desired. Easier access to patented 
information should – ideally – improve the general level of innovation in society, since it 
(ceteris paribus) will cost firms less to generate this information themselves. The Internet also 
positively affects the ability of patent authorities to gather, store, systematize, interpret, and 
transmit information, and the ability of other market participants to gain access to, and use, 
the patented information developed by innovators. But access to information is not the same 
as the ability to use this information efficiently, indicating the need for the development of 
new tools and systems to this end. 
 
The paper starts with a brief review of the economic rationale of the patent system. In 
Sections 3 and 4, we investigate the two main questions, as briefly introduced above. The 
paper ends with a broader discussion of the issues raised.  
 
 
2. Benefits and costs of the patent system 
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2.1. The economic rationale of the patent system 
 
The economic rationale of the patent system is based on the problem of appropriability 
(Arrow, 1962, Nelson, 1959). New knowledge is valuable because at least initially, it is 
private to the innovator. When the knowledge is revealed (as when the product is marketed), 
its value decreases, since other firms can exploit all or part of the knowledge to their own 
ends, without having to pay for its creation. Thus the ability of the innovator to appropriate 
the rents from its investments in R&D will inevitably decline over time, unless the innovator 
takes measures to prevent this.  
 
One such measure is to apply for a patent. By taking out a patent, the inventor can exclude 
others from making, selling, or using the invention for a specified period of time, typically 
twenty years (or license out the rights to another). In return, the firm agrees to publish the 
details of the invention in the patent, so that others can build on it in their own innovative 
activities, furthering technological progress (Penrose, 1951, Machlup, 1968).2 A further 
dimension of the incentive effects of the patent system was noted by Kitch (1977) in his 
analysis of the patent as a “prospect.” Not only was the patent a reward to innovative work, he 
contended, it also enabled the firm to explore, and perhaps commercially exploit, the 
possibilities of a promising technological area free from the interference of others.3  
 
It has long been recognized that patents are only imperfect instruments of appropriability. For 
one thing, it is not possible to describe the invention sufficiently in the patent so as to 
appropriate all the rents. The more details revealed, the greater the chance that imitators will 
build on the knowledge for their own gain – without patenting it, but without paying for its 
creation either. But the fewer the details revealed, the greater the chance that rivals can patent 
their own marginally different versions. This also means that the degree of information 
disclosure associated with the patent depends on what aspects of the new product or process 
the firm seeks to patent. Parts of the invention may be patented, others kept secret. 
 
 
2.2. The costs of the patent system 
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The patent system also imposes a range of different costs, both on the innovating firm and 
society more generally.4 The innovator incurs costs in determining what is patentable, 
applying for the patent, and paying the relevant fees – throughout the life of the patent, in all 
countries in which protection is sought. To protect the invention fully, the firm may need to 
obtain dozens or hundreds of patents on related technologies. The uncertainties of patenting 
impose further costs: the patent might later be declared invalid, competitors might take out 
patents on marginally different versions of the good, and/or the patent might be infringed.  
 
Five social costs of patenting may be identified. First, government patent examiners must 
devote resources to processing applications and maintaining patent files, along with offering 
services to the public such as patent databases, answering questions, updating home pages, 
and the like. Second, as a temporary monopoly, the patent enables the seller to choose the 
level of price and output that maximizes overall profits (and covers its initial R&D costs), 
which increases its incentive to invest in R&D but also imposes a deadweight loss. Third, the 
patent system is characterized by other forms of rent-seeking, such as “patent races” (Harris 
and Vickers, 1985), where several firms compete to patent an invention or area of technology, 
with the result that too many resources are devoted to applying for and defending patents, and 
not to actual innovative work. A related phenomenon, “pre-emptive patenting” (Gilbert and 
Newbery, 1982), refers to the practice of applying for patents simply to obtain priority to the 
legal rights to the invention, but without (necessarily) intending to exploit the invention 
commercially. Fourth, as Scotchmer (1991) has pointed out, the broader the patent protection 
provided to the “first generation” innovator, the weaker the incentives to invest in R&D will 
be for the “second generation” innovator that builds on the first patent – and vice versa. A 
final group of social costs are associated with the enforcement of patent rights: the costs of 
maintaining the legal system within which patent lawsuits are pursued.  
 
 
2.3. The increasingly strategic use of patents 
 
In recent years, firms are applying for more patents, and using them in new ways. In the year 
2000, the U.S. Patent Office granted around 182,000 patents, up from around 100,000 a 
decade earlier. In 2000, it received 315,000 patent applications. The European Patent Office 
received 140,000 patent applications in the same year.  
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Earlier, patents were viewed mainly as the province of the legal department; today, they are 
considered an integral part of corporate strategy (Rivette and Kline, 2000a,b). A firm might 
take out one, several, or hundreds of patents to assert its claim to a new technology, 
blanketing a wide territory and blocking competitors from entering the protected area. Patents 
can also function to “enclose” a rival’s patents, blocking them from proceeding without 
paying license fees. A patent application can send a “signal” to would be stock market 
investors that the firm possesses the juridical basis for continued future growth, and that it 
will not face a lawsuit from a market rival that possesses the patent rights to the technology. 
Patents can provide the legal basis for a take-over or an R&D collaboration. They can serve as 
indicators of the productivity of individual inventors, or individual firms. Alternatively, the 
innovating firm might decide to publish the information instead of patenting – often in a 
scientific work in an obscure language – effectively preventing any other firm from 
subsequently patenting the idea, since it is no longer novel.  
 
 




Since the patent law has traditionally been under the jurisdiction of national governments, 
there have been key national differences concerning what can, and cannot, be patented.5 In 
many countries, for example, patents were initially not granted for pharmaceutical products, 
given the importance to public health of their widespread availability at affordable prices. 
Over the past few decades, these national differences have been reduced, as countries have 
sought to reach international agreement and standardize the criteria of patentability, not least 
through the TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement under the auspices 
of the World Trade Organization (e.g. Primo Braga, 1995).  
 
Even so, crucial differences remain, particularly as regards Internet business methods. To be 
patentable in the United States, an invention must be novel, non-obvious, and industrially 
useful. In Europe, the invention must also be of a technical character. Thus in America, the 
mere fact that an invention utilizes a computer or software makes it eligible for patentability, 
while in Europe, the invention must involve an advanced technical creation. This means that 
in the U.S., the restrictions on patenting business methods are negligible, whereas in Europe, 
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Broadly speaking, in all countries, inventions involving mathematical methods, administrative 
improvements, teaching methods and book-keeping systems have not been seen as satisfying 
the criteria of patentability. As a result, firms that developed new business methods found it 
difficult to prevent imitation, and have had to devise other approaches to appropriability. For 
example, Ikea’s innovation of selling easy-to-assemble quality furniture at a lower price than 
store assembled and delivered furniture initially won the firm a wide customer following – but 
was so easy to copy that Ikea’s competitors were soon able to offer the same service. (Yet 
Ikea was able to maintain its competitive edge by effective brand name advertising combined 
with rapid global expansion, with the result that imitators consistently lagged behind.) 
 
Even so, in the United States, according to a recent White Paper (January, 2001, available on 
the Internet) by the U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office (USPTO), patents have been granted 
for certain types of financial and other business methods for over two hundred years. The first 
financial patent was granted in 1799 to Jacob Perkins for an invention to detect counterfeit 
notes. For more than a century, patents have been granted on various types of mechanical 
business methods. Among the earliest were a series of patents for method and apparatus 
patents automating the tabulating and compiling statistical information for businesses and 
enterprises, taken out by a company that in 1924 was renamed the International Business 
Machine Corporation. 
 
Pressures to allow patents on Internet business methods derives, to a large extent, from 
developments in the patentability of software. Originally, computer programs fell under the 
purview of copyright law. But copyright law protects only the expression of an idea, not the 
underlying invention. As a result, a software firm could obtain a copyright on the written 
source code for the concrete version of its program, but if another firm marginally changed 
the source code, it could obtain its own copyright. Software producers argued that it should be 
possible to patent the principle underlying the program, as long as there was a demonstrable 
technical effect. During the 1980s, U.S. patent examiners began to issue such patents; later, 
patent examiners in many other countries followed suit.  
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Currently in the United States, electronic business methods are seen, in essence, as a form of 
process patents, or more precisely, “automated business data processing technologies.” 
According to American patent law, the class “processes” includes methods for operating 
computers, sending data over a network, or displaying information on a screen (Lee and 
Davidson, 1997). Electronic business methods are generally regarded as patentable as long as 
the claim is structured in a manner acceptable to the U.S. patent authorities or the courts. In 
2000, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office received 7,800 applications for software-
implemented business method patents, up from 700 in 1996. It issued 899 business method 
patents in that year (USPTO, 2001). 
 
The viability of patent claims on Internet business methods in the United States was 
considerably strengthened in 1998 with the final Supreme Court ruling on the so-called State 
Street decision, brought by State Street Bank and Trust Co. against Signature Financial 
Group, Inc. In 1993, Signature Financial Group patented a “hub-and-spoke” data processing 
system that enabled multiple mutual funds to pool their assets in a single investment portfolio 
organized as a partnership, both reducing administration costs and providing tax advantages. 
State Street Bank and Trust Co. had developed a similar administrative system of multi-tiered 
partnership financial services. When the bank learned that Signature had patented a business 
method closely resembling its own, the bank negotiated with Signature for a license to use the 
patent. When negotiations broke down, State Street brought suit in a Massachusetts district 
court, asserting that Signature’s patent was not new – and therefore invalid. The court agreed. 
Signature then appealed the decision to a federal court, which reversed the lower court 
decision. In 1998, the patent was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. This opened the door to 
a flood of patent applications on software-implemented Internet business methods. 
 
In Europe, by contrast, as mentioned earlier, to be eligible for patent protection, an invention 
must have a technical character. Thus software-implemented business methods are not 
excluded from patent production per se, as long as they otherwise fulfill the criteria of 
patentability. Many such methods have, in fact, been patented in Europe (and Japan). But 
software-implemented business methods do not, necessarily, possess the required technical 
effect. The question then becomes: Should the European Patent Organization make an 
exception to the “technical effect” requirement of its patent law for software-implemented 
business methods?  
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If so, this would mean establishing a special category for these inventions, since they, alone, 
would not have to demonstrate a technical effect. This would lead to two problems. First, 
how, exactly, would the criteria of patentability for these inventions be defined in Europe? 
The change in the patent law would have to be extremely well-defined, to avoid the inevitable 
differences in interpretation that would inevitably otherwise result. And second, why should 
an exception be made for these particular inventions – why shouldn’t the exception be 
extended to all kinds of inventions under the European Patent Convention, bringing broader 
European practice into harmony with broader American practices? The specific issue at hand 
thereby raises a much larger issue of principle. One might ask, for example, whether a more 




3.2. Economic dilemmas posed by Internet business method patents 
 
Proponents of the extension of patent protection to Internet business methods argue that their 
patentability is a natural development in the emerging global network economy. During the 
Industrial Revolution, it was important to be able to patent physical products and processes. 
During the Information Revolution, it is correspondingly important to be able to patent 
concepts and ideas. The incentive effects, it is contended, outweigh the costs of administering 
the system and the other social costs.  
 
Outside the United States, this logic has thus far not been accepted. A main reason European 
patent authorities have taken a different approach from their American colleagues has been 
social policy: patent monopolies should only be granted where it is possible to ascertain the 
subject and scope of the monopoly with a high degree of certainty. To the European patent 
suthorities, not only to Internet business methods lack the requisite degree of inventiveness or 
technical effect, it is also very difficult to determine whether they are original or novel. This 
raises both the uncertainties among the parties involved in any dispute, and problems in 
adjudicating disputes (Davies, 1999, pp. 16-19). We will return to this question below. 
 
An illustration of the economic dilemmas posed by patents on Internet business methods is 
Ipsil LLC’s patent-pending technology which it claims will make it possible to link anything 
to the Internet, including building controls, sensors, industrial measurement devices and 
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medical devices. Manufacturers could build tiny, low-cost devices that could communicate 
with each other over the Internet. Ultimately, they could be knit together to form an intelligent 
network (Copeland, 2000). Such a technology – if it proves commercially viable on a wide 
scale – can potentially extend the reach of the Internet into virtually aspect of life. To what 
degree would it “matter” that the patent rights to such a basic technology governing access the 
Internet are controlled by one firm? Or is the promise of this control a necessary incentive to 
R&D? 
 
To take another example, Henry C. Yuen of Gemstar-TV Guide International Inc. has 
accumulated nearly two hundred patents on an interactive program guide which, he hopes, 
will eventually be the first screen all American viewers see when they turn on their TV (just 
as AOL is the first screen most Americans see when they turn on their Internet connection). 
The program would not only help viewers sort through the hundreds of different channels on 
offer to find what they want to see, it would also enable them to click into other opportunities 
such as recording the news, buying movies, or accessing the Internet. By using this portal, 
viewers would pay a fee – either indirectly, through advertisements, or directly through their 
cable TV charges. Both Microsoft and AOL, along with over one hundred cable companies, 
have licensed the technology. Yuen reportedly aggressively ferrets out and sues those who do 
not buy license rights, and was characterized by one magazine as a “patent terrorist.” (see 
Grover et al., 2001). Should this approach to the patent system be encouraged? 
 
 
3.3. Benefits and costs for the innovating firm 
 
According to the rationale of the patent system, the opportunity to patent Internet business 
methods should both give firms the incentive to invest in these technologies, and lead to more 
information disclosure than would otherwise be the case. If we consider the “prospect” 
function of the patent system (Kitch, 1977), the extension of patent protection to such 
business methods should additionally give innovators the time and opportunity to try out 
different methods in a broad area of technology and choose the best to pursue commercially.  
 
Dell Computers is an example of a modern firm that has thoroughly and aggressively patented 
its basic method of doing business. Over forty patents cover its build-to-order direct sales 
model, including both its on-line customer-configurable ordering system, and the way this 
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system is integrated into Dell’s manufacturing, inventory, distribution and customer service 
operations (Rivette & Kline, 2000a). This use of patents is widely regarded as a key factor in 
Dell’s continuing competitive success. Had Dell not patented its business model, rivals might 
later have imitated it and themselves appropriated a higher percentage of the rents. 
 
Patents carry a range of strategic benefits to firms; this is no less the case for Internet business 
methods. For example, Priceline.com Inc.’s patent on its buyer-driven (“name-your-own-
price”) electronic airline ticket auction system was reportedly crucial both to its ability to 
attract Richard Braddock as its CEO, and to raise venture funding worth $100 million, an 
enormous amount for a start-up Internet company (Rivette and Kline, 2000b, p. 8). Similarly, 
Internet business method patents can form the linchpin of business partnerships. In 2000, for 
example, AT&T Wireless announced that planned to form a wholly owned subsidiary with 
Japan’s NTT DoCoMo, the global leader in wireless data, to develop multimedia applications. 
Under the agreement, AT&T Wireless would receive the exclusive rights to NTT DoCoMo’s 
brand and method patents; no other operator in North America would be allowed to use the 
technology (Luna, 2000). Firms have allegedly also utilized their patent holdings as weapons 
to “scare” online retailers into paying license fees (normally around $30,000), to keep their 
cases out of court (Messmer, 2000).  
 
Even so, firms face substantial costs in applying for and enforcing these patents. The degree 
to which companies will be able to use their patents to establish fully enforceable monopoly 
rights over the use of their business method patents remains to be seen. Consider British 
Telecom’s patent on hyperlink technology. First, the company must establish that its patent 
covers the basic enabling technology for hyperlinks. Since the patent dates back to the 1980s, 
and was only “discovered” recently due to a routine administrative check (Friedman, 2000, 
Rohde, 2000), this may not be possible. Second, the patent claims must be broad enough to 
preclude the development of rival systems. Third, the patent must survive challenges in court. 
Thorny jurisdictional problems (to be discussed below) mean that the company’s authority to 
enforce its patent will vary considerably from country to country.  
 
Of crucial importance is the issue of patent validity. To what extent are Internet business 
methods really new? Many, according to critics, simply represent a set of software-coded 
instructions to automate commonly known business processes in the physical world. Thus 
Priceline’s electronic ticket system is similar to the way car buyers and dealers haggle.  
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Similar uncertainties surround Amazon’s one-click patent. When Amazon’s archrival, Barnes 
& Nobel, sought to use its own single-click system, Amazon sued. Barnes & Nobel claimed 
that Amazon’s patent was invalid. Initially, the court issued a preliminary injunction against 
Barnes & Nobel. In February, 2001, the court overturned the injunction, finding that Barnes & 
Nobel had mounted a substantial challenge to the patent. Among other things, company 
lawyers had argued convincingly that existing Compuserve technology represented prior art. 
Nevertheless, the court emphasized, its ruling in no way resolved the question of invalidity 
(Parker, 2001), as the case was yet to be decided. Such court costs are a drain on both 
companies resources. Might not they have been used more productively? 
 
A related problem is that many Internet business method patents assert too broad claims. E-
data, for example, recently sued a dozen Internet firms for patent infringement. The firm 
argued that its patent (which had been issued six years before the creation of the World Wide 
Web) covered any form of Web commerce where software, music or other products were 
downloaded directly into a user’s computer. But the court denied E-data’s claim. Then too, a 
large percentage of patents on software technologies – estimates run as high as 50% - do not 
cite prior art. (Prior art is seen, on the patent application, as references to patents or other 
written work on which the application builds.) Such patents will probably be found to be 
invalid, if tested in court (Rivette and Kline, 2000b, pp. 19-21).  
 
Another cost is that it can be quite difficult for Internet business method patent-holders to 
determine whether infringement has occurred, since the Internet is used by so many firms and 
individuals. Even where an infringement is discovered, it does not always make sense to 
pursue it. Much depends on the subject matter and its importance to the firm, and the speed of 
technological advance. Only as a last resort do firms take infringement cases to court, due to 
their expense and uncertainty. Given the adverse publicity that could arise from such a 
lawsuit, in light of the “open access” ideology of most Internet users, pursuing such a course 
might well cause the company to lose money over the longer run. Differences in national 
patent policies and judicial systems create further unknowns (see Section 3.5). 
 
Even so, the costs of the uncertainties of not applying for a patent are also high. Thus 
Priceline’s founder, Jay Walker, has been quoted as saying that that he could not have started 
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the company without the patent, which preventing the airlines from freely copying his idea 
(quoted in Harmon, 2001).  
 
 
3.4. Implications for society 
 
The main societal benefit of patents is to encourage invention and innovation. But to what 
extent does this logic really apply to Internet-related technologies?  First of all, many key 
discoveries have been conceived in government and university laboratories, neither or which 
were profit-motivated. Why, then couldn’t we expect a continuous stream of new inventions 
in Internet business methods from these inventors, regardless of whether or not firms could 
patent them? Moreover, millions of websites have been created by individuals, with motives 
ranging from the joy of creating to the desire to impress other people to the impulse to hurt 
other businesses and organizations – but not the profit motive. Allowing patent monopolies 
into this area of technology might arguably even reduce the total amount of innovation in 
Internet business methods over the longer term. On the other hand, many of the business 
methods patented by firms would not be of interest to academic or government researchers. 
Thus absent patent protection, they might not be invented.  
 
The second societal benefit of the patent system is information disclosure. Here, one might 
argue that to the degree that information about new Internet business methods would 
otherwise not be made public, the opportunity for firms to read others’ patents provides a 
clear advantage. On the other hand, to the degree that these inventions cannot be kept secret 
or protected in another way, the information would probably have become available anyway, 
and the stock of public knowledge would not notably have been increased. One might also 
question whether something like a “one click” system truly represents knowledge. 
 
As noted in the previous section, patents also involve costs. The first type of costs has to do 
with the administration of the system. Societal costs are incurred processing applications 
(including further education and training of patent officials), building up websites containing 
the relevant information, and answering an increased number of queries from firms 
considering taking out patents. While patent examiners have considerable experience in older 
areas such as mechanical engineering and chemicals, with excellent databases within which to 
search for prior art, this is not (yet) the case for software and Internet technologies.  
 14
 
One problem is that government salaries offered are not competitive with those in business. 
Not surprisingly, many talented patent examiners leave government service after a few years 
and move to private firms. This not only deprives patent offices of expertise, but also imposes 
new costs in the form of training replacements, and enables the firms that hired the former 
examiners to draw on their expertise without having to pay for it. The problem is particularly 
acute with regard to recruitment for examiners in new technical areas like Internet business 
method patents. Not only do U.S. patent examiners reportedly start at salaries of $28,000, 
their workloads have also swelled in recent years. They are asked to make decisions in new 
technological areas that even seasoned patent officials find difficult. And while the number of 
patent applications rose 11% between 1998 and 1999, funding for the U.S. patent office fell, 
and it was required to spend 16% less on operations. (Ross, 2000). 
 
Second, that firms can obtain patent monopolies on systems involving Internet access could 
well change the traditionally open character of Internet-based business. Much will depend on 
the degree to which patent-holders enforce their monopoly rights to methods important to 
other users, and the degree to which they license out the rights to all comers at reasonable 
fees. In 2000, for example, Apple Computer became the first company to license 
Amazon.com Inc.’s one-click patent, reportedly to allow its customers easier and faster access 
to the on-line store. For Amazon, the agreement also strengthened its efforts to defend the 
validity of its controversial patent (Tillett, 2001). 
 
Often the will to resolve conflicts exists. When Priceline sued Microsoft’s travel spin-off, 
Expedia, for infringing their “reverse auction” system for reserving flights, the two companies 
then worked out a royalty agreement which satisfied both (Parker, 2001). On the other hand, 
according to Andrew Steinberg, vice president of the Internet travel site Travelocity.com 
(whose company also had to pay to use Priceline’s system), the proliferation business method 
patents effectively hampered innovation, with firms diverting resources that could have gone 
into developing new products to paying legal fees. (Harmon, 2001). 
 
The proliferation of patents on Internet business methods in the U.S., the problems faced by 
patent examiners in assessing them, and the many questions raised about their long-term 
validity, would also seem to indicate that both patent races and pre-emptive patenting are 
rampant here. The purpose of many patent applications on Internet business methods may 
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well be simply to allow the applicant to come first – to assert its claim ahead of potential 
competitors – rather than a reflection of a clearly thought-out plan to develop and 
commercialize a promising new technology. Even if such patents are later rejected, they will 
have served their purpose, at least partly, by preventing other firms from making, selling or 
using the technology while the patent was pending. But to the extent that many patents are 
rejected (or subsequently declared invalid), the societal resources devoted to processing them 
will in effect have been wasted. 
 
The fourth cost of patents had to do with the effects of patents over time. As noted above, 
Scotchmer (1991) has argued that the broader the scope of the patent taken out by the “first-
generation” innovator, the weaker the incentives for “second-generation” innovators, and vice 
versa. Since patents on Internet business methods are so new, it is difficult to evaluate their 
“inter-generational” effects. But clearly, patents on basic Internet business methods such as 
British Telecom’s patent on hyperlink technology might well hinder future innovation, 
depending on how the scope and reach of this patent is interpreted in the courts.  
 
 
3.5. Jurisdictional issues 
 
Finally, patents on Internet-related technologies raise substantial – and costly – jurisdictional 
issues. As mentioned earlier, patent authorities often differ from country to country as to what 
is patentable. Such differences clearly spill over into the court system. For example, in a case 
brought by Merrill Lynch, a U.S. court allowed a patent for method of doing business, since it 
included the use of a computer. In England the same claim by the same company was turned 
down, the court ruling that even though the method included a computer, this did not change 
the fact that it concerned a method of doing business, which was excluded from patent 
protection. Contradictory decisions have even been made with regard to the same types of 
inventions. For example, while a U.S. court granted patent protection on an algorithm in a 
ROM chip (in the case Re. Iwahashi, 1989), an English court denied patent protection to a 
very similar claim (Gale’s Application, 1991) (Davies, 1999).  
 
Moreover, jurisdictional boundaries for Internet technologies are unclear. Since patents have 
only national force, patents granted in the United States normally have no effect outside U.S. 
jurisdiction. U.S. users will typically be able to access all Internet products and services, 
 16
irrespective of their physical location. That patented technology is utilized outside the United 
States may not be enough to protect these non-American users from accusations of patent 
infringement. Thus the utilization by a European firm of a method patented in the U.S. could 
be seen, in practice, as occurring in the United States, thereby infringing the patent. Similarly, 
American firms could conceivably deliver Web-based applications from a location in Europe 
without having to worry about U.S. patents (Friedman, 2000). The attorney generals of 
several U.S. states have actually asserted that they have jurisdiction over all Internet activities, 
regardless of the locations of those activities or to whom they are addressed (Davies, 1999). 
The question of liability may well, in the end, turn on an interpretation of what constitutes a 
connection with the state in question. 
 
Because of the global character of the Internet, jurisdictional disputes may well arise as to 
where the use of the patented business method took place. Analysts have noted that firms 
outside the United States which use Internet business methods patented in the United States 
need only be concerned about patent infringement suits if they are active in the American 
market (Wallberg, 2001). Again, this will need to be decided by the courts.  
 
Several ideas have been proposed to address the international problems posed by the 
divergence between American and non-American practices. One is for the United States to 
restrict the subject matter for which it grants patents. This would be quite difficult, however, 
to the degree that it involves revoking existing patent rights held by the parties concerned. 
Another solution would for other national patent offices to extend patent protection to include 
electronic business methods. This would incur opposition from countries that feel that patent 
monopolies, with the resultant social costs, should not be granted here (Davies, 1999). 
Broadly speaking, these complex legal issues are as yet unresolved, and substantially increase 
the uncertainty costs of patenting to society. We will return to this question in the Conclusion. 
 
 
4. Impact of the Internet on firm patenting practices 
 
4.1. Accessing and using patent-related information 
 
Earlier, patent databases were largely proprietary; today, several open databases have been 
established on the World Wide Web, available to users with a simple click of the mouse. 
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These include the databases maintained by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office, the European Patent Office, IBM, and the Franklin 
Pierce Law Center Intellectual Property Mall. Specialty patent databases have been created to 
cover areas such as agricultural biotechnology, AIDS, and chemical abstracts. Firms often use 
online updating services that automatically e-mail their users information like SEC filings, 
news releases, and patents related to the companies they are following (Kahaner, 2000). 
Dartmouth College, for example, has created an intellectual property business-to-business 
Web site exchange (UVentures.com) to help universities and governments sell technologies 
developed in their laboratories to businesses (Little, 2000). 
 
The services provided by national patent offices have also become more user-friendly. Earlier, 
if the firm’s engineers were interested in particular patents or groups of patents, they could 
come to the patent office library and browse through the files. Today, they can obtain the 
relevant information over the Internet. The Internet database operated by the USPTO allows 
users to search for patents in specified areas, by class and subclass, by date, and so forth. By 
clicking on a patent of interest, the user can read its abstract, the name of the inventor, the 
assignee’s name, the date of filing, and the references cited, with links to the patents in 
question. Users can then order copies of any patents of interest.6 The British Patent Office 
Library has developed a slightly different approach. Access to its patent database is fee-based, 
but to encourage use, the library conducts training workshops to introduce researchers to how 
to evaluate and interpret patent information, and access online patent databases and related 
information (Anonymous, Professional Engineering, 2001).  
 
The availability of web-based patent databases and related services can help to decrease firm 
costs in applying for patents, since patent information is more readily available. At the same 
time, since this information is in “raw” form, and there is so much of it, the costs of sorting 
and interpreting it will rise. The sheer volume of this information is daunting: some 30 million 
pages of patent documents exist. Further, since everyone has access to the same types of 
information, what matters is not the amount of information to which one has access, but the 
ability to analyze this information and determine its value.  
 
This, in turn, has led to the emergence of new consultant agencies specializing in the retrieval 
and interpretation of patent information. Value-added databases like Derwent World Patent 
Index help to “clean” and sort patent data in a preliminary fashion, charging customers for the 
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search costs. Other consultants, like Mogee Research & Analysis Associates, analyze this data 
further, assisting clients both in assessing their patent positions among their competitors, and 
discovering and understanding trends in new technology. A third group of consultants 
specialize in accessing and systematizing various types of information on the Internet, 
including patents, and sell the information to clients as a form of competitive intelligence 
(Kahaner, 2000). Consultant firms have also been set up to evaluate the legal issues 
surrounding business method patents. 
 
Software technicians have created new data-mining and visualization techniques, enabling the 
generation of “patent maps” of the firm’s own and competitors’ R&D activities, showing their 
relative strengths and weaknesses. Armed with this knowledge, a firm can attempt to block its 
rivals and strengthen its own proprietary positions. Patent mining can additionally reveal the 
relative age of the patent holdings of a potential target for acquisition (particularly the date of 
expiration), so that the would-be buyer can evaluate whether or not its patents will continue to 
be valuable over the longer term. Access to patent-related information sources on the Internet 
has greatly decreased the costs of building such databases. 
 
 
4.2. The Internet as a medium for patent signaling and exchange 
 
The accessibility of patent databases over the Internet also enhances firms’ opportunities to 
signal others that they have staked out their “territory” in a particular area. This can facilitate 
the buying and selling of patent rights (including cross-licensing), making it easier for 
potential collaborators to link up. The more firms know about each others’ patent portfolios, 
the better such markets will work. Thus the Internet adds a new dimension to the commercial 
value of the disclosure requirement of the patent law.  
 
In addition, patents have become a key indicator of value for companies, particularly for start-
up firms. If a new venture has a strong patent position, this indicates both that it is serious 
about its product development plans, and that it is less likely to be blocked from developing 
and marketing its technology in the future by patent lawsuits initiated by rivals. The Internet 
arguably makes it easier for such firms to stimulate market awareness of their patents by 
using them as signals. 
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At present, about 120 businesses have set up web-enabled intellectual property exchanges, 
including IBM and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Another example is the Patent & License 
Exchange, Inc. (http://Pl-x.com). None existed twenty years ago. Other, more specialized 
exchanges include the Intellectual Property Technology Exchange, Inc. (TechEx), which 
focuses on early-stage biomedical and life sciences, from basic research to issued patents. To 
reduce the risks of utilizing these exchanges, new insurance products for potential licensees 
have been introduced. Exchanges specifically devoted to patents include sites run by Patent 
Action.com and PatentCafe.com, Inc. The first, modelled on eBay, has over 300 selected and 
evaluated patents in all areas, along with 3,500 registered, evaluated buyers. PatentCafe 
serves a wide audience of inventors and technology managers, from schoolchildren to patent 
professionals. Listings are free, financed by e-commerce and banner advertising. No 
registration is necessary; buyers and sellers deal directly with each other (Bauman, 2000). 
 
Organizations such as Pl-x.com offer a full-service interface covering every aspect of the 
transaction, requiring participating firms to provide all the information necessary for the sale 
of the intellectual property, including insurance to protect the buyer if a patent is later 
declared invalid. The company reports that it has over 170 subscribers who can buy and sell 
technology. It provides a financial market approach for licensing intellectual property, using 
proprietary algorithms to calculate value, price and financial risk. In the past, the only way to 
obtain comparable information was to use a technology broker, who normally charged a fee 
of about 30% of the transaction. Generally speaking, Web-based exchanges are paid a 
commission on the value of each patent sale or license; Pl-x.com also collects revenues from 
annual subscriber fees (Studt, 2000). 
 
Before the introduction of these sophisticated Web-based exchanges, finding partners with 
relevant patented technologies was typically a “hit or miss” situation. Intellectual property 
vendors and buyers were relegated to using cumbersome and incomplete software tools and 
databases which linked firms together, but where cooperation often ultimately failed due to 
the inherent uncertainties involved. The more patents become an integrated element of a 
firm’s competitive strategy, the more important patent-related sources of information will be, 
and the greater the incentive to bear these costs.  
 
Ironically, the Internet can be used as well to discover the necessary evidence to prove or 
disprove the validity of patents on Internet-related technology. Patent databases can be mined 
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for information on prior art, which can be used both in company patent searches and in 
connection with lawsuits. Netscape, for example, established a website asking for information 
about prior art after being sued by Wang over its browser function “save as.” (Parker, 2001) 
 
As mentioned earlier, innovating firms can choose to publish new knowledge instead of 
patenting it, rendering it impossible for anyone else to take out a patent. Many firms 
deliberately publish knowledge in obscure sources and later, if another firm tries to patent 
technology incorporating this knowledge, reveal its existence to the firm or the patent 
authorities. The impact of the Internet on such practices is as yet unclear. On the one hand, 
there will be new places on the World Wide Web to hide information that can be used to 
declare a rival’s patent invalid. But the ready access to information via the Internet, combined 
with the development of powerful search engines, may also mean that otherwise obscure 
sources of information can more easily be discovered. 
 
An intriguing recent development in this regard is Cella’s establishment of the website 
Bountyquest in 2000. For a fee of $2,500 plus a cash prize of $10,000 or more, customers can 
post a reward on the site, to be paid upon receipt of proof that the “prior art” in a patented 
invention was publicly available before the patent was issued. Several bounty hunters have 
reportedly already collected large rewards. Another firm, IP.com, gives inventors the 
opportunity to “defensively disclose” on its web site any material they choose not to patent, 
for a fee of $109 (Harmon, 2001, Anonymous, Business Week, 2001). 
 
 
4.3. Implications for innovation 
 
Following the economic rationale of the patent system, web-based patent databases and 
related services might be expected to lead to a higher level of innovation in society. Access to 
patent-related information is less dependent than in the past on factors like firm size and 
financial position, previous experience with patents, or geographical location. Yet because 
this information is only as valuable as the ability to interpret it and use it commercially, large 
multinationals continue to possess a considerable edge over smaller companies. 
 
As regards patent examiners, on the one hand, the Internet clearly improves their ability to 
provide patent information to inventors quickly and easily – thereby enhancing the timeliness 
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and accuracy of their information services. Establishing these services incurs high fixed costs, 
but since the information can largely be standardized and made available to an infinitely 
expanding number of users at virtually zero marginal cost (as compared with answering user 
requests by mail and telephone), the overall costs of distributing patent information will 
ultimately, ceteris paribus, reduced.  
 
On the other hand, the plethora of information contained on the World Wide Web, combined 
with the broader increase in other sources of scientific and technical information, makes it 
more difficult for patent examiners to establish prior art – and thereby ascertain whether the 
invention is really new. In processing the application, examiners must determine the degree to 
which the invention described differs substantially from existing knowledge, which means 
they must search exhaustively through technical sources in many different languages, in all 
parts of the world. It is this that makes the patent the strongest form of intellectual property 
right – but which additionally puts great pressure on patent authorities to be as certain as 
possible that granted patents fulfil it.  
 
The TRIPS agreement (regulating trade-related aspects of international intellectual property 
rights, under the aegis of the WTO), while intended to standardize international patent 
practices, has in effect served to compound these administrative problems. The signatory 
countries of the TRIPS agreement were given until the year 2000 to enact the required 
provisions, and most have done so. Yet for many countries, these provisions have been 
enacted only on paper, with no practical relevance. If making decisions about prior art is 
problematic even for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the European Patent Office, 
with their modern data processing systems, it is next to impossible for patent examiners in 
other countries. India, for example, a country of a billion people, has just 44 patent officials 
(as opposed to 3,000 in the United States, with one-fourth the population of India), rendering 
effective administration of the Indian patent system impossible. The accelerating availability 
of information available over the Internet only makes such problems worse.7  
 
On the other hand, the Internet can facilitate new ways by which patent authorities can 
interact with users to improve the quality of government patent services. The Danish Patent 
and Trademarks Office (DKPTO), for example, has developed a new model called IPscore, to 
help firms manage and value patents and trademarks, and to integrate intellectual property 
rights into their overall business strategy. By using this tool, they can gain an overview over 
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their intellectual property holdings, and learn about unexploited opportunities. Users, based 
on their experience with IPscore, are actively encouraged to report back to DKPTO over the 




5. Costs and benefits in a wider perspective 
 
Weighing the different benefits and costs, we argue, in this paper, that extending patent 
protection to Internet business methods represents a logical, natural – and in fact inevitable – 
development as we move forward in the emerging knowledge economy, where competitive 
advantage derives less from tangible assets, and more from intangible ones. The resultant 
tensions with regard to the use of patents are particularly acute in the case of Internet-related 
inventions, where the technology is advancing so rapidly. And since the main events are so 
recent, it is not always easy to determine the nature and scope of these benefits and costs. 
Yet the strategic use of patents in relation to the Internet, while currently more disruptive than 
for many other kinds of technologies, is only part of the larger pattern of the more strategic 
use of patents by firms in all sectors.  
 
There have always been initial periods of confusion when patent protection is extended to a 
new technology. What is needed, today, is to reconsider the basics of the relevant legal 
framework in light of these changes. The goal is to maximize the benefits of the patent system 
in relation to the Internet – both as an incentive to invention and innovation, and as key source 
of new technical information – while minimizing the costs.  
 
An important question here concerns what is the value of these patents to innovating firms. A 
key difference between the pharmaceutical and IT industries, for example, is that while drug 
firms will not invest unless patent protection exists, the IT industry’s current use of patenting 
is a potential value-enhancing element rather than a foundation for investment. How, then, 
would Internet-related investment have evolved if patenting had not been available? A strong 
case can be made that much innovation would probably have occurred anyway. Perhaps, in 
later years, many of the companies themselves will ask whether patenting Internet-related 
“inventions” was, in practice, worth all the cost and effort. 
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Much also depends on how the technology creates value.  Software and Internet technologies, 
like telephone and telegraph technologies before them, are typically based on network 
externalities, where the value of the technology is dependent on the number of users. (When 
only a few people owned telephones, its expansion was restricted; telephones were mainly a 
status-laden “toy” for the rich. As more people acquired telephones, the value of the telephone 
as an actual communications medium increased.) Technologies characterized by network 
externalities grow very slowly at first, and then suddenly, after achieving critical mass, grow 
explosively, eventually “locking in” their customers. Users then face high switching costs in 
changing to another system: learning about the new system, ensuring compatibility, and so 
forth. (These issues are explored in greater detail in Chapter ___ , “Is Appropriability a 
‘Problem’ for Innovations in Digital Information Goods” elsewhere in this book.)  
 
Hyperlink technology is characterized by substantial network externalities. As mentioned in 
Section 3, the degree to which British Telecom finds it to its own interests to enforce its 
patent rights strictly here – or to encourage as many users as possible to come on board – 
remains to be seen. Moreover, should a firm seek to dominate the market, the courts can 
always intervene at some later time, as was true in the past in the antitrust suits against AT&T 
and IBM in the 1950s. Companies have also found that high-profile patent lawsuits can 
damage their reputation. This is reportedly the case for Amazon, which, in the wake of the 
adverse publicity surrounding its one-click patent lawsuit, has taken its approach to patents 
under review (Parker, 2001). 
 
Another substantive issue – and one that has not, to my knowledge, been emphasized in the 
public debate on Internet business method patents – concerns the broad societal benefit 
stemming from the publication of new technical information by one firm (or in one country) 
for the rest of the world. When an American firm patents an Internet business method, the 
information is disclosed. Thus firms operating outside of the American market can not only 
learn from the patent – they are also, at least at present, free to use the method. This imposes a 
complex set of benefits and costs. On the one hand, the patent provides the American firm 
with the incentive to invest in R&D. Yet while the patent can prevent other American firms 
from imitating the knowledge – it cannot prevent non-American companies and individuals 
from doing so. Until patent laws in this area are standardized, at least some of the information 
that might otherwise have been patented will remain secret. 
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To the extent that the details published in U.S. patents on Internet business methods are 
valuable, they represent a substantial “knowledge externality”. Thus since European, Asian 
and other firms can free ride on this knowledge to develop their own imitations of the method 
in question, it may considerably undermine the incentive effects of these patents. One might 
even conjecture that, sooner or later, U.S. firms may decide that the overall costs imposed by 
patenting Internet business methods outweigh the benefits.  
 
Many patents on Internet business methods, as noted earlier, will probably later be declared 
invalid. Might the apparent lack of interest in drawing up strong patent applications reflect, at 
least in part, a recognition by many American firms that it doesn’t really matter if the subject 
matter is not new. What counts is to obtain the temporary monopoly conferred by the patent 
application before – and just after – publication. The value of this temporary monopoly is 
enhanced for American firms since in the U.S., applications are not published until the Patent 
Office has made the decision to grant the patent; in Europe and Japan, by contrast, patent 
documents are published eighteen months after the date of application. As long as the patent 
application is kept secret, the knowledge cannot be copied. Free-riding by non-American 
firms is concomitantly limited. By the time the application is published, the knowledge may 





The Internet, because of its dual character as both a source of innovation in its own right, and 
a means of transmitting information, has not only itself emerged as an important object of 
patenting, but has also affected how firm use patents. This paper has addressed, in a 
preliminary manner, the interactions between the growth of the Internet, the increasingly 
strategic use of patents by innovating firms, and the wider benefits and costs of the patent 
system. We demonstrated that the Internet, as a highly efficient communications medium, has 
profoundly affected the conditions of firm access to patent-related information, particularly 
with the development of sophisticated patent databases, information search services, and the 
like. The patent system, in turn, crucially affects developments in the Internet, due to the 
extension of patent protection to cover Internet business methods.  
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The key policy issue with regard to Internet business method patents has to do with the 
criteria of patentability. How “permissive” should patent authorities be? National patent 
offices continue to differ in this respect. Yet the trend – in contrast to developments in 
software patenting – may well be towards greater restrictiveness. Recently, the European 
Patent Office upheld its ban on software-implemented business method patents. And 
legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives to establish higher 
standards for issuing patents in this category.  
 
Further, the opportunities inherent in using the Internet as a highly efficient medium for 
communicating and transmitting patent-related information could and should be exploited 
more fully. The Internet could be harnessed to take some of the pressure off national and 
international patent authorities through the development of web-based patent databases, 
making it is easier to search for information on existing patents and related technologies. At 
present, national patent authorities are responsible for searching for prior art. One way of 
easing this burden would be the development of a sophisticated, technical system, permitting 
automatic electronic patenting filing from any country in the world to any patent office. Such 
patents would be required to be put into a format easier to use, and earlier problems which 
have plagued patent processing activities, such as incorrect or missing information, would be 
caught at an earlier stage (some even performed electronically). It is the goal of the USPTO to 
accept 70% percent of its applications via the Internet over the next decade.8  
 
Reforms like this can work only if the political will exists. International differences as regards 
the patentability of Internet business methods, and the validity of many of these patents, 
require urgent consideration. Thus far, the USPTO examiners have tended to act unilaterally, 
both with regard to Internet business methods, but also more generally, extending patent 
protection into new subject areas (like biotechnology) without discussing the implications of 
these extensions with their patent colleagues internationally. Due to the resulting uncertainties 
as to what is patentable (and where), such precipitous actions substantially increase the 
patent-related costs of both firms and governments, not only in the United States but around 
the world as well.  
 
To the degree that the kinds of “games” – as described in Sections 3 and 5 – are being played, 
it would seem appropriate for patent authorities in the United States, Europe, Japan, and other 
interested countries, to meet and work out a more internationally standardized approach to 
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patents on Internet business methods. Many in the United States, as we have emphasized, 
support raising the standards of patentability. A solution would be to establish an international 
forum within which senior trade officials and patent authorities in different countries – at the 
highest level – could meet to address these problems, both with regard to the principles of 
patent protection, and the effective administration of the system.  
 
Participants in such a meeting could confront not only the immediate subject of contention – 
the patentability of software-implemented business methods – but also the broader issues 
implied. Should the standards for patentability be raised? If so, how might this best be 
accomplished? In particular, might not the requirement that an invention has to demonstrate a 
“technical effect” be introduced, more generally, as a criterion of patentability in all countries 
– including the United States?  
 
International agreement strengthening and harmonizing the criteria of patentability would 
serve both to preserve the benefits of the patent system, while decreasing the costs. Such 
reforms would help to restore the “balance” implied by the patent system, which in recent 
years seems to have swung too far in the direction of lowered standards of patentability. The 
purpose of the patent system is to encourage and reward the creation and commercial 
development of valuable technical knowledge – not the creation of patent monopolies in 
trivial devices. Clearly, reaching international agreement on this issue would be extremely 
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1 This chapter has benefited greatly from comments from Jerome Davis, Besher Wattar and the editors of this 
volume.  
 
2 The patent system functions as an incentive to both invention and innovation. It motivates inventors to create 
new products or processes by enabling them to appropriate at least part of the return. Without patent protection, 
inventors might use their energies in other ways, or perhaps keep their inventions secret. The patent system also 
motivates innovators to make the large additional outlays to bring the invention into commercial use (further 
R&D, the construction of pilot plants, introducing the product to market, and so forth). These outlays are so large 
and uncertain, it is argued, that they might not be made without patent protection.  
 
3 By awarding the exclusive ownership of each of its technological prospects to one inventor shortly after 
discovery, society both optimized the use of technological resources and minimized waste, since other inventors 
did not allocate resources in the area of the prospect. 
 
4 This general conceptualization of the benefits and costs of patenting is based on a number of different sources. 
These include the literature on the innovative firm’s strategic use of patents and patent information (e.g. Rivette 
and Kline, 2000a,b); studies of the costs associated with the innovator’s choice of appropriability strategy 
(Davis, 1988, 1998); the welfare economics literature on appropriability generally (e.g. Arrow, 1962, Nelson, 
1959) and patents in particular (e.g. Harris and Vickers, 1985, Gilbert and Newbery, 1982); studies of the 
cumulative effects of patents over time (Scotchmer, 1991, Merges and Nelson, 1994); the property rights 
literature both generally (e.g. Demsetz, 1967, Posner, 1992), and as the logic applies to patents in particular 
(Kitch, 1977); and the economic effects of intellectual property rights (Besen and Raskind, 1991). The 
distinction between the innovating firm’s benefits and costs, and the broader benefits and costs to society, 
reflects both the division in the literature as a whole as regards level of theoretical analysis, along with the 
distinction between the private and social benefits and costs associated with investments in R&D characteristic 
of the economic analysis of appropriability.  
 
5 The U.S. patent law has also generally, over the past two decades, been extended more quickly than has been 
the case in other countries (sometimes with the U.S. courts overruling decisions made by the Patent Office) to 
cover inventions in software (earlier covered by copyright law), life forms, and Internet business methods. 
Europe and other countries have subsequently often followed the U.S. lead. 
 
6 There are at present certain limitations on the type of information available. The USPTO’s database does not 
include information on the current fee status of the patent, or whether or not it has expired (this information may 
be acquired via the USPTO’s home page). The database begins with patents from 1976 onwards. For information 
about earlier patents, users are requested to visit a Patent and Trademark Depository Library or are referred to a 
commercial service. If they know the specific patent number, however, they can order a copy of the patent. 
 
7 Described by Bruce Lehman, President and CEO, International Intellectual Property Institute, Washington, in 
his presentation, “The future of the global patent system,” at the conference by the Danish Patent and Trademark 
Office, Copenhagen, January 19, 2001. Countries may have different traditions as regards searching for prior art. 
In the past, for example, the Japanese Patent Office only looked at Japanese patents to establish prior art 
(supplemented by the patent databases of the USPTO and the EPO). Yet most prior art for new technologies is 
not available here, but in other types of technical publications.  
 
8 Described by Lehman, January 19, 2001. 
 
